By Siegfried Evens and Achim Klüppelberg
„The present authors felt it was desirable to show this positive experience in the domain of the radiation safety of nuclear power. This is all the more important in that the view is often expressed that nuclear power is a dangerous branch of industry and a source of harmful effects on the personnel, the population, and the environment. Such unqualified statements cannot bring anything else but actual harm.“1
Soviet scholars in the field of radiation safety discussing the Chernobyl-type reactor in 1983.
Today we commemorate the 33rd anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Since that fateful Friday night on 25-26 April 1986, a lot has happened. The world witnessed the thus far biggest nuclear cataclysm in northern Ukraine. The Soviet Union was unable to mitigate the radioactive consequences of the exploded and burning reactor and was frozen in awe to the unknown danger of the invisible power of the atom. Fingers were pointed very quickly towards the personnel as the quickest scapegoat and indeed, many mistakes and transgressions in regard to Soviet regulations were made. Later on, fingers were pointed towards the several institutions and the insufficient design of the reactor. Nuclear engineers in the West assured the general public that such an accident could not happen on the capitalist side of the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, since Fukushima-Daiichi in 2011 we know for sure that the organisation of nuclear safety by political structures is not so evident as nuclear enthusiasts might want to portray it.
For us, researchers of the NUCLEARWATERS-project, a day like this reminds us of the possibility to engage in an investigation of nuclear safety from many different angles. Chernobyl might not only teach lessons to nuclear engineers and state ministries, but also to researchers of the social sciences and the humanities.
What in our analysis of nuclear safety has been left out so far? What has been neglected? Have we looked beyond the events? Have we considered the more structural causes of the accident, such as safety culture, political decision-making, or the structural complexity of nuclear technology? Have we dared to look beyond the power plant? To its environment, and the huge amounts of water flowing into the cooling system and tipping the balance between energy production and massive nuclear meltdown? And how can we then contribute and translate that knowledge towards a better nuclear safety’s discourse?
Apart from being a day of memory, it was also a regular day in which about 450 reactors produced electricity worldwide. Chernobyl forces us to remember what can go wrong if nuclear safety is not tackled with the necessary attention.
In this sense, let us use the fatal example of Chernobyl, to put substance into our research in order to contribute to a better discourse on nuclear safety.
1Vorob’ev, E.I./ Il’in, L.A./ Turovskiĭ et al.: Radiation Safety of Atomic Power Plants in the USSR, in: Atomic Energy (Vol. 54, No.4. April 1983), Luxembourg/ Berlin/ Heidelberg 1983, pp. 290-301, here p. 300.